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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the Executive Master in Business 
Administration (EMBA) at the International Hellenic University.  
 
The objective of this study was to determine and assess the historical evolution of key 
financial ratios and risk indicators of the four Greek systemic banks (Alpha Bank, 
EuroBank, National Bank of Greece and Piraeus Bank), before and during the sovereign 
financial crisis that initialized in 2009, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
Based on financial data of 31/12/2015, these banks accounted for over 88% of the 
country’s banking assets and over 91% of the total customer deposits. The analysis 
employs, in annual frequency, selected financial ratios and specialized risk indicators, 
applicable specifically to the banking sector. The research period expands from 2004 to 
2015, split in the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) years, as far as the 
domestic sovereign crisis is concerned. Moreover, the performance of the four 
domestic banks was compared to the average performance of a group consisting of 
130 banks in Eurozone countries that are considered ECB-significant. 
 
Our analysis revealed that the sovereign crisis led to a severe deterioration of almost 
all financial ratios and risk indicators for the four domestic systemic banks. 
Furthermore, in most cases the negative impact of the crisis on the domestic banks’ 
performance was significantly higher than that of other financial institutions of similar 
characteristics in the Eurozone. 
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Section I. Introduction 
The objective of this study is to determine and assess the historical evolution of key 
financial ratios and risk indicators of the four Greek systemic banks, before and during 
the sovereign financial crisis that initialized in 2009, in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, and continues till the present. Through the analysis of the evolution of 
critical ratios and risk indicators during the last decade, the extent of the negative 
impact of the domestic crisis on the country’s banking sector performance is revealed.  
The results and conclusions of this analysis may be utilized by: a) banks’ executives and 
management, in the setting up of future business plans and strategies, b) investors, in 
order to evaluate past or future capital investment decisions, c) policy makers and 
supervisory authorities, in order to enhance and strengthen regulatory policies and 
requirements, d) academic community, as it complements the existing research, and e) 
the general public, which forms the banks’ clientele and whose trust to the domestic 
banking sector appears shaken. 
 
This study report is arranged in the following manner: Section 2 provides background 
information on the sovereign crisis in Greece as well as on the challenges faced by the 
domestic banking sector during the last years. Section 3 discusses the existing 
literature relevant to the subject of the current research. Section 4 describes the 
methodology followed during the study. Section 5 presents and interprets the analysis 
results and findings. Section 6 discusses the conclusions derived for the analysis 
results, the actions and initiatives taken so far, mainly by the regulatory authorities 
and lastly provides recommendations for the mitigation of the identified issues. 
 
 
Section II. Background - Sovereign Crisis and banking sector in Greece 
The financial crisis, which originally broke out in the United States in August 2007, and 
rapidly deteriorated during autumn 2008 with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers 
investment bank, evolved into a global economic crisis within the environment of 
closely interlinked economies, causing the world’s greatest recession since the 1930s. 
The impact on all the economies of the world and the deterioration of public finances 
in most countries was adverse. Major international stock markets have fallen, large 
financial institutions have collapsed or been bought out, and governments in even the 
wealthiest nations have had to come up with rescue packages to bail out their financial 
systems. 
 
The initial investigations of the root causes of the US crisis revealed the existence of 
financial products and instruments so complex and twisted and in some cases 
inadequately monitored and regulated. These factors have led to a failure of trust in 
the whole system. The financial system though is based on trust, which once lost, is 
very difficult to regain (Lewitt, 2016). 
 
In Greece, the period following the entry in the Economic & Monetary Union (EMU) 
was marked by rapid raise in the economic activity fueled by rising individual income, 
credit expansion and mainly residential investment. It is worth noting though, that 
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during the years 2001-2007 and while the domestic economy was growing at an 
average annual rate of 4,2%, the country’s international competitiveness declined by 
14% mainly due to increased labor costs. Moreover, the inflation was high (more than 
double of the Eurozone average) and the current account deficit rose to unsustainable 
levels (183% increase on the annual average, compared to the previous decade). 
 
Even after the break out of the global crisis in 2007, the previous long period of strong 
growth led to the naive forecast that this would continue in the coming years as well. 
The Updated Stability and Growth Programme submitted by the country’s finance 
minister to the European Commission on 30.1.2009 stated, among other things, the 
following: “In 2009, growth would continue at a rate of 1,1%,which would pick up to 
1,6% in 2010 and to 1,9% in 2011”1. As it is apparent from the above, while the 
international crisis was spreading at rapid rates all over the world, the Greek 
government at the time treated it as a distant phenomenon, ignoring the severity of 
the situation and the risk of it turning into a severe sovereign debt crisis (Bank of 
Greece, 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, adverse developments in 2009 resulted in a derailing of fiscal 
aggregates, with the deficit and public debt reaching 15,7% and 129,7% of GDP 
respectively. Figure 1 presents the domestic debt in percent of GDP for the last 
decades in comparison to the Eurozone average2. After fifteen years (1994-2008) of 
continuous growth, GDP in 2009 decreased by 3,2% and the domestic economy 
officially entered into recession and a multiyear crisis. 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Greece’s debt to GDP since 1977 
Following the break out of the sovereign crisis and the subsequent country’s lower 
credit ratings, the domestic banking system was gradually isolated from the 
international interbank market, fact that led to serious liquidity problems. The large 
percentage of Greek government bonds held by domestic banks made their position 
even more difficult and vulnerable. As presented in Figure 2, Greek banks were among 
                                                 
 
 
1
 https://greeceinfo.wordpress.com/2009/02/09/greece-updated-stability-growth-programme/ 
2
 Appendix E presents the GDP evolution on Eurozone countries 
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the main creditors of the Greek state in 2011, before the execution of the Private 
Sector Involvement (PSI) Programme, which involved a loss of 53,5% of the nominal 
value of the Greek Government Bonds (GGB) held by each institution. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Top Creditors of Greece in 2011 before the PSI implementation3 
 
The participation of the Greek banks in the Programme had a severe impact on their 
capital adequacy and resulted in significant losses and even negative equity in some 
cases.  
In the years that followed, the domestic banking sector faced significant challenges on 
multiple fronts: 
 Capital shortage that led to three major recapitalizations during the period 
2013-2015. These repeated recapitalizations resulted in the complete 
restructuring of the banks’ shareholder base, rendering the Hellenic Financial 
Stability Fund (HFSF) as a majority shareholder and dissipating the invested 
funds of the old shareholders. 
 Increase of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) to unprecedented levels due to 
shrinking of personal income and soaring of the unemployment rate. Based on 
data from The World Bank4, as of 31/12/2015, Greek banks were holding the 
3rd position in the world on Non-performing Loans, following San Marino (1st) 
and Cyprus (2nd). Moreover, due to the crisis, the loan collateral quality and 
value were continuously deteriorating. 
 Liquidity shortfalls due to isolation from the interbank market and continuous 
reduction of the customer deposits, as a result of over taxation but mainly due 
to loss of trust for the banking system by the general public. 
                                                 
 
 
3
http://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/top_news/760529_Griechenlands-Untergang-Europas-
Ende.html 
4
 http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/Nonperforming_loans/ 
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As a consequence of the above, within the crisis years, more than 12 banks, based and 
operating in Greece, were assessed by Bank of Greece as non-viable and were led to 
resolution, substantially decreasing the number of financial institutions in the country. 
As of July 2016, only 17 banks had their base in Greece and only 4 of those were 
considered systemic (Appendix A). 
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Section III. Literature Review 
The importance of financial institutions in today’s economic environment is widely 
accepted and recognized. Delphi International consulting firm in their official report5 to 
the European Commission (1997) highlighted the key role of financial institutions: 
• as investors, supplying the funds required to achieve development and growth, 
• as innovators, designing new financial products to cover emerging needs, 
• as evaluators, pricing risks and estimating returns, for companies, projects and 
others, 
 as stakeholders – shareholders or lenders, they can exercise considerable 
influence over the companies’ management. 
 
In order to obtain an understanding and be able to elaborate or compare research 
results, a literature review was performed bringing out the following pertinent 
research studies: 
 
Andries and Ursu (2016) used the frontier technique to highlight the differences in the 
impact of the global financial crisis on the efficiency of commercial banks in the EU 
during the period 2004–2010. Their research results show that the crisis has a 
significant and positive impact on both the cost and profit inefficiencies of the 
commercial banks from the EU, and that this impact is higher on eurozone banks. In 
terms of cost efficiency, the most affected by the crisis were the large publicly traded 
banks, operating in old members of the EU. With regard to the profit inefficiency, the 
global financial crisis seems to have had a lower impact on the large public banks.  
 
Chatzi, Diakomihalis and Chytis (2015) performed a comparative analysis based on 
CAMEL methodology among Greek Commercial Bank institutions listed in Athens Stock 
Exchange Market for the period 2006-2012. Based on their research results, during the 
pre-crisis period, domestic banks were characterized by high profitability and liquidity, 
enhanced capital adequacy and satisfactory loan portfolio quality. During the initial 
years of the sovereign crisis (2009-2012), domestic banks’ profitability, liquidity and 
capital adequacy appeared seriously impaired and a high increase in NPLs was noticed. 
The research also concludes that Greek banks were not highly exposed to market risk.  
 
Similarly, Mehta (2012) examines for the period of 2005 to 2010 whether the financial 
performance indicators of the UAE banks listed on Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange, have 
been impacted by the Global economic crisis. The results of the study conclude that 
the recent global crisis has impacted the UAE banks’ financial performance, causing a 
decrease of their profitability and liquidity and an increase of their leverage ratios. 
 
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2010) analyzed the profitability of 453 commercial banks in 
Switzerland over the period from 1999 to 2008. In order to assess the impacts of the 
recent financial crisis, they incorporated in their analysis certain macroeconomic 
variables and also split the research period into the pre-crisis (1999-2006) and crisis 
years (2007-2008). Their research results conclude that the financial crisis had a 
                                                 
 
 
5
 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/finserv/fisum.pdf 
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significant effect on the banks’ profitability and a high negative impact on the loan loss 
provisions. 
 
Parashar and Venkatesh (2010) performed a research covering the period 2006-2009 
and using the ratio analysis method, in order to assess the impact of the global 
financial crisis on Islamic banks in comparison to conventional banks that belong to the 
Gulf Cooperation Council6. The analysis results reveal significant impact on both type 
of banks in terms of capital ratio, leverage and return on average equity return on 
average assets and liquidity. The impact was higher on Islamic banks for the first three 
variables and higher on conventional banks for the two last ones. 
 
Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2005) examined the effect of bank-specific, 
industry-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability for the period 
1985-2001, using an empirical framework that incorporates the traditional Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis. The study results revealed that: a) capital 
adequacy is important in preserving bank profitability and that increased exposure to 
credit risk lowers profits, b) all bank-specific determinants, with the exception of size, 
affect bank profitability significantly, and c) macroeconomic control variables clearly 
affect the performance of the banking sector. 
 
Muda, Shaharuddin and Embaya (2013) performed a research to identify the 
determinants of profitability of Islamic banks operating in Malaysia and also examine 
the effect of the global financial crisis on the profitability of these banks. Panel data 
estimation was employed on data of seventeen Islamic banks, using quarterly data for 
the period of 2007 to 2010. The empirical results indicated that overhead expenses 
ratio, loans ratio, deposits ratio, technical efficiency and bank size have a positive 
significant effect in determining banks’ profitability, while the market inflation rate has 
a negative one. The study also revealed that the profitability of Islamic banks is 
negatively affected by the global financial crisis. 
 
From the results of the abovementioned studies, it is evident that macroeconomic 
factors affect the performance of the banking sector in general, with the financial crisis 
appearing to have a significant negative impact on it. Nevertheless, considering the 
banks’ systemic importance, a study of the evolution of the financial and risk indicators 
of the four major systemic banks in Greece was considered valuable and motivated by 
the facts that:  
i. to the best of my knowledge, there are no other published studies covering the 
specific bank group or the time period under investigation,  
ii. the historical data for the two research sub-periods (pre-crisis and crisis) is 
considered adequate to extract conclusions on domestic banks’ performance,  
iii. the reorganization and transformation of the sector, during the crisis period, 
led irretrievably to a completely new banking environment for the years to 
come, 
                                                 
 
 
6
 Gulf Cooperation Council is an economic group of six countries, namely, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. 
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iv. as the macroeconomic environment remains fragile and the domestic banking 
sector continues to face severe challenges, impact analysis of past management 
initiatives on banks’ key ratios may prove particularly helpful moving forward. 
 
Furthermore, the contribution of this analysis research to the domestic banking sector 
may be detailed as follows:  
a) The financial information and analysis results may be used by banks’ executives 
and management in designing future business plans and strategic initiatives 
that focus on key financial figures that enhance efficiency and in parallel retain 
risks to the minimum level possible.     
b) Through the recording of the evolution of key financial ratios and risk indicators 
during a period of economic uncertainty and financial distress, may be used by 
banks’ financial analysts to determine predictable future trends on the same or 
similar ratios and indicators.  
 
Moreover, supervisory authorities and policymakers of the Eurozone countries may 
utilize the analysis results and conclusions to strengthen the respective framework, 
promote efficiency and sustainability of the banking sector. 
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Section IV. Methodology 
This study focuses on the four larger banks in Greece, namely, Alpha Bank, EuroBank, 
National Bank of Greece (NBG) and Piraeus Bank, all publicly listed in Athens Stock 
Exchange, with NBG also listed in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Based on European 
Central Bank’s (ECB) Regulations, these banks fulfill the relevant criteria (e.g. 
possessing assets of value over €30 bn) to be considered significant/systemic for the 
European banking system. Moreover, based on Bank of Greece’s statistical data7 as of 
31/12/2015, these banks accounted for over 88% of the country’s banking assets and 
over 91% of the total customer deposits.  
 
The analysis employs, in annual frequency, selected financial ratios and specialized risk 
indicators, applicable specifically to the banking sector. The financial ratios chosen 
form part of the Moody’s investor department’s list of key “Banking Account and 
Ratios8” and the majority of them were also analyzed in the studies mentioned in the 
Literature Review section. The risk indicators selected cover the areas addressed by 
the latest Basel III Accord, issued in 2013 in an effort to address the risks that led to the 
last global financial crisis. 
 
The research period expands from 2004 to 2015, split in the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and 
crisis (2009-2015) years, as far as the domestic sovereign crisis is concerned. It must be 
noted though, that as the crisis in the country is still ongoing, it is not feasible for its 
overall impact on the domestic banking sector to be recorded through the current 
research. This limitation may be overcome through a complementary research, only 
after the domestic crisis is officially over.  
 
Taking into consideration the global nature of banking business and more specifically 
the European financial integration, a comparison group was compiled. The group 
consists of 130 banks in Eurozone countries (Appendix B) that are considered ECB-
significant, as their assets’ value exceeds €30 bn (as of 31/12/2015). Bank data was 
sourced mainly from the global Bankscope database. In order to capture the significant 
contribution of the Greek banks’ subsidiaries during the crisis, the consolidated 
statements (Bankscope type: C2) were used for all banks. In cases of missing 
information in the Bankscope database for any of the Greek banks, data was retrieved 
from their published financial statements and annual reports or from other types of 
official disclosures made (e.g. Pillar III). 
 
The financial ratios and risk indicators analyzed cover the following key areas: 
 General Performance Indicators 
o Asset Growth 
o Credit Growth (Gross loan portfolio) 
o Customer Deposits Growth 
 Efficiency & Profitability Indicators 
                                                 
 
 
7
 http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/el/Statistics/monetary/nxi.aspx 
8
 https://www.scribd.com/document/250823272/Banking-Account-and-Ratio-Definitions 
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o Cost to Income Ratio 
o Net Interest Margin 
o Profit Before Tax 
o Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 
o Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 
 Capital Adequacy Indicators 
o Tier I & Total Capital Ratio 
o Shareholder’s Equity to Total Assets Ratio 
 Asset Quality Indicators 
o Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans 
o Impaired to Gross Loans 
o Loan Loss Reserves to Impaired Loans Ratio 
 Liquidity Indicators 
o Loans to Customer Deposits 
o Liquid Assets to Deposits & Short-term Funding 
o Liquid Assets to Total Assets 
o Funding from the Eurosystem 
o Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
 
A description and the calculation method for each one of them is provided in the 
following section, before the respective analysis results. 
 
Lastly, the formula developed by A. Charitou to estimate probability of default for 
financial institutions is applied to the four domestic banks, in two instances: a) using 
their 2008 financial data, before the sovereign crisis begins and b) using their latest 
available 2015 financial data. The formula uses the “CAMELS” model performance 
indicators, namely: 
 Capital Adequacy, 
 Asset Quality, 
 Management Capability, 
 Earnings, 
 Liquidity, 
 Sensitivity to Market Risk. 
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Section V. Data Analysis and Interpretation of Findings 
As already mentioned above and in order to assess the impact of the Greek sovereign 
crisis on the domestic systemic banks, the fluctuation of multiple financial ratios and 
specialised key indicators for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis period (2009-2015) 
was analysed. The overall average for the Greek banks in comparison to the Eurozone 
banks is also tabulated in each table. Moreover, in Appendix C, the detailed yearly data 
per indicator is provided.  
General Performance Indicators 
The following sub-section presents the analysis results on general indicators that trace 
banks’ performance and growth. 
Asset Growth 
Table 1 presents the average annual asset growth per systemic Greek bank for the pre-
crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) period. In the pre-crisis period, Greek banks’ 
assets were growing significantly by an average of 21,3%, mainly due to the aggressive 
expansion in countries of South Eastern Europe. The respective average of the 
Eurozone banks for the same period came up to 12,3%, recording approximately half 
the growth of the Greek banks. During the years of the crisis though, the asset growth 
of banks of both groups basically ceased, since the average was 2,55% and 1,44% 
respectively. A closer look on the four Greek banks’ asset portfolio actually reveals a 
shrinking trend during the crisis, which was counterbalanced by the loan portfolio 
acquiring of multiple small domestic banks that were considered non-viable and were 
led to resolution. It be noted though, that NBG’s total assets for FY2015 include an 
amount of €27,7 bn “assets held for sale”, due to the planned sale of its biggest 
subsidiary Finansbank, that materialised in 2016. By excluding that amount, the asset 
shrinkage for the specific bank for FY2015 reaches 27,5%. 
Table 1: Average annual Asset Growth (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Assets Growth (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
(comp. to 
2014) 
Alpha Bank 16,53 1,45 -91,24 -4,99 
Eurobank Ergasias 24,15 -1,21 -105,00 -2,60 
National Bank of Greece 13,96 1,52 -89,09 -3,45 
Piraeus Bank 30,76 8,45 -72,54 -1,97 
Greek Banks Average 21,35 2,55 -88,04 -3,25 
Eurozone Banks Average 12,30 1,44 -88,32 -0,45 
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The graphical representation of the annual asset growth of the two bank groups is 
presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Graphical representation of Asset Growth (2004-2015) 
 
Gross Loan Portfolio (Credit) Growth 
Table 2 presents the average annual credit growth (Gross Loans) per systemic Greek 
bank for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) period. In the pre-crisis 
period, Greek banks’ credit portfolio was growing by an average of 26,6%, while 
Eurozone banks’ average reached 15,3%. Many analysts claim that the high expansion 
of the Greek banks credit portfolio during that period was at the expense of strong 
underwriting standards, which later led to the high increase of the NPL ratios. During 
the years of the crisis, the average gross loans growth of banks in Greece and in 
Eurozone has dropped by 90% and 81% respectively. As explained in the previous 
subsection, the credit growth of the four Greek banks was actually negative but 
counterbalanced by the loan portfolio acquiring of multiple small Greek banks that 
were deemed non-viable and were led to resolution. The high shrinkage (-26%) of 
NBG’s loan portfolio in 2015 is due to the planned sale of its biggest subsidiary 
Finansbank, that materialised in 2016.  
 
Table 2: Average annual Gross Loans Portfolio Growth (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Gross Loans Portfolio 
Growth (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
(comp. to 
2014) 
Alpha Bank 23,74 3,47 -85,39 -0,52 
Eurobank Ergasias 27,85 -1,22 -104,37 -0,38 
National Bank of Greece 25,01 -1,77 -107,07 -26,01 
Piraeus Bank 30,02 10,16 -66,15 -6,73 
Greek Banks Average 26,65 2,66 -90,02 -8,41 
Eurozone Banks Average 15,34 2,94 -80,84 1,85 
-13- 
The graphical representation of the gross loans growth of the two bank groups is 
presented in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Graphical representation of Credit Growth (2004-2015) 
 
Customer Deposit Growth  
Table 3 presents the average annual customer deposit growth per systemic Greek bank 
for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) period. In the pre-crisis period, 
Greek banks’ customer deposits were increasing by 18,3%, double the ratio of their 
Eurozone peers (8,86%). At the end of 2009, customer deposits in the four Greek banks 
had reached the maximum, for our research period, amount of €191 bn. In the years 
that followed though and due to the general political and economic uncertainty, 
combined with the risk of non-compliance with the debt repayment programs, the 
deposits’ outflow was continuous and significant, resulting in 2015 to the imposition of 
capital controls and to a balance of €144 bn at the end of that year. This amount is 
approximately equal to the deposits balance at the end of 2007 for the four banks, 
which signifies that, in terms of amounts, all deposits gained by the acquisition of the 
smaller banks (approx. €45 bn) were withdrawn from the system by the end of 2015. 
On the contrary, Eurozone banks, during the crisis, appear to have grown their 
deposits balance by an annual average of 3,8%, substantially lower than the pre-crisis 
rate though.  
Table 3: Average annual Customer Deposit Growth (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Customer Deposit 
Growth (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
(comp. to 
2014) 
Alpha Bank 17,10 -1,81 -110,61 -26,55 
Eurobank Ergasias 19,23 -2,54 -113,22 -22,22 
National Bank of Greece 11,84 -5,24 -144,26 -33,82 
Piraeus Bank 24,98 9,87 -60,47 -28,80 
Greek Banks Average 18,29 0,07 -99,62 -27,85 
Eurozone Banks Average 8,86 3,18 -64,15 6,80 
 
-14- 
As presented in Figure 5, 2015 was the worse year for the domestic banks in respect to 
customer deposits, with an annual average outflow of -27,85%. 
 
 
Figure 5: Graphical representation of Customer Deposit Growth (2004-2015) 
Efficiency & Profitability Indicators 
The following sub-section presents the analysis results on financial indicators that 
trace banks’ profitability and management efficiency. 
Cost to Income Ratio 
The cost-to-income (CTI) ratio is a key financial measure presenting a bank’s costs in 
relation to its income9. The ratio, calculated as the division of operating expenses to 
income generated before provisions, gives investors a clear view of how efficiently the 
bank is being run – the lower the ratio, the more profitable the bank. Table 4 presents 
the average annual Cost to Income ratio per systemic Greek bank for the pre-crisis 
(2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) period. In the pre-crisis period, Greek financial 
institutions appear to manage their expenses more efficiently than the banks in the 
rest of the Eurozone countries. Even during the crisis and although domestic banks’ CTI 
ratio has deteriorated (16,64% increase), it still remained lower than the average one 
of Eurozone banks. It is worth noting though, that at the end of financial year 2015, the 
average CTI ratio of the domestic banks was materially increased, due to National Bank 
of Greece’s ratio escalating to 88,2%. From a closer look of NBG’s income statement 
for the specific year, this increase is attributed to the high shrinkage of the bank’s 
income. 
Table 4: Average annual Cost to Income ratio (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Cost to Income (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 48,45 57,42 18,52 55,84 
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Eurobank Ergasias 48,44 57,89 19,52 62,83 
National Bank of Greece 56,44 67,20 19,07 88,20 
Piraeus Bank 55,91 61,53 10,06 64,83 
Greek Banks Average 52,31 61,01 16,64 67,93 
Eurozone Banks Average 61,95 63,05 1,77 61,93 
 
Greek banks’ better management of operating expenses in relation to income, 
especially during the first section of the research period, is evident through the 
graphical representation of Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Graphical representation of the Cost to Income ratio (2004-2015) 
Net Interest Margin 
Net interest margin (NIM) measures the difference between interest received and 
interest paid, relative to the value of interest generating assets10. It typically refers to 
the interest margin between what is gained from the borrower of bank’s funds and 
what is paid to the bank’s depositor. Table 5 presents the average annual Net Interest 
Margin per systemic Greek bank for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) 
period. During the whole of our research period (pre- and through crisis), Greek 
financial institutions appear to manage their interest generating assets more efficiently 
than the banks in the rest of the Eurozone countries. It is worth noting that even 
during the crisis, domestic banks’ average NIM was approximately double the average 
one of Eurozone banks, as presented in the graphical representation of Figure 7. 
Taking into consideration though that during that period, domestic banks made 
excessive use of the costly ELA mechanism to source funds, leads to the conclusion 
that the interest charged by domestic banks to borrowers is notably higher compared 
to their Eurozone peers.  
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Table 5: Average annual Net Interest Margin (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Net Interest Margin 
(%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 3,41 2,91 -14,89 3,10 
Eurobank Ergasias 3,62 2,48 -31,53 2,28 
National Bank of Greece 3,59 3,32 -7,57 2,24 
Piraeus Bank 3,01 2,38 -20,94 2,53 
Greek Banks Average 3,41 2,77 -18,72 2,54 
Eurozone Banks Average 1,64 1,43 -12,61 1,40 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Graphical representation of the Net Interest Margin ratio (2004-2015) 
 
Profit before Tax 
Profit before tax (PBT) is a profitability measure that records the bank's profits after 
the deduction from revenue of all interest and operating expenses, except for income 
tax11. Table 6 presents the total and average annual profitability (Profit before Tax) per 
systemic Greek bank for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) period. In the 
pre-crisis period, Greek banks’ record profits every year with an annual average of 
€811 mn, lower than Eurozone banks’ average of €1.057 mn. During the crisis years, 
Eurozone banks appear to have successfully retained their PBT on the positive side, 
recording an annual average profit of €556 mn (reduced by 47%). On the contrary, 
Greek banks present a significant reduction of 327% in their profitability, recording 
material losses of €51,6bn in aggregate for the period 2009-2015. The majority of the 
losses (€32,5 bn) was recorded in financial year 2011, due to the Greek banks’ 
participation in the PSI exchange programme, which entailed impairment losses of 
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53,5% on the nominal value of the Greek Government Bonds held by the banks. It is 
worth noting that even in FY2015, six years after the initialization of the Greek 
sovereign crisis, each of the four domestic systemic banks recorded more than €2bn 
losses before tax (€10,6 bn in aggregate). 
Table 6: Average annual Profit before tax pre- and through-crisis. 
Profit Before Tax 
(€ mn) 
Total for 
period 
2004-2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Total for 
period 
2009-2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-
Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the 
two periods (%) 
Financial 
Year 
2015 
Alpha Bank 3.629 725,80 -6.158 -879 -221,21 -2.066 
Eurobank Ergasias 3.876 775,20 -13.853 -1.979 -355,29 -2.086 
National Bank of Greece 6.479 1.295,80 -19.086 -2.726 -310,42 -3.589 
Piraeus Bank 2.239 447,80 -12.558 -1.794 -500,63 -2.930 
Greek Banks Average  811  -1.844 -327,43 -2.667 
Eurozone Banks Average  1.057  556 -47,40 1.079 
 
 
The significant deterioration of the Greek banks’ profitability during the crisis period is 
evident, through the graphical representation of Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Graphical representation of Profit before Tax (2004-2015) 
 
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 
Return on average assets (ROAA) is an indicator of how efficiently a company is 
utilizing its assets and it’s calculated by the division of net income by average total 
assets12. Table 7 presents the average annual Return on Average Assets ratio per 
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systemic Greek bank for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) period. In the 
pre-crisis period, Greek banks’ management efficiency led to a double ROAA of 1,28%, 
in comparison to the 0,59% ratio of their Eurozone peers. During the crisis though, 
Eurozone banks’ ROAA, although reduced by 71%, remained positive, in contrast with 
the Greek banks that due to the severe losses, recorded a negative average ROAA of -
1,66% (reduced by 230%).  
Table 7: Average annual Return on Average Assets ratio (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Return on Average 
Assets (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 1,24 -0,74 -159,60 -1,93 
Eurobank Ergasias 1,17 -1,85 -257,22 -1,55 
National Bank of Greece 1,40 -2,06 -246,83 -3,71 
Piraeus Bank 1,29 -2,01 -255,57 -2,15 
Greek Banks Average 1,28 -1,66 -230,20 -2,34 
Eurozone Banks Average 0,59 0,17 -71,28 0,41 
 
The significant deterioration of the Greek banks’ ROAA during the crisis period is 
evident through the graphical representation of Figure 9. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Graphical representation of the Return on Average Assets ratio (2004-2015) 
 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 
Return on average equity is a financial ratio that measures the profitability of a 
company in relation to the average shareholders' equity. This financial metric is 
calculated by net income divided by the average shareholders' equity for a specific 
period of time13. Table 8 presents the average annual Return on Average Equity ratio 
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per systemic Greek bank for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) period. In 
the pre-crisis period, Greek banks’ recorded almost a double ROAE of 17,09%, in 
comparison to the 9% ratio of their Eurozone peers. During the crisis though, Eurozone 
banks’ average ROAE was almost zero (-0,87%), in contrast with the Greek banks 
average ROAE that was significantly deteriorated to an annual average of -95,31% 
(reduced by 657%). Such a high ratio actually signifies that the average losses on an 
annual basis were as high as the funds invested by the banks’ shareholders.  Even at 
the end of FY2015, following the latest recapitalization of the Greek banks (November 
2015), the average ROAE recorded was -24,20%.  
Table 8: Average annual Return on Average Equity ratio (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Return on Average 
Equity (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 17,30 -17,98 -203,97 -16,37 
Eurobank Ergasias 16,71 -224,51 -1443,27 -17,19 
National Bank of Greece 16,32 -6,19 -137,93 -41,38 
Piraeus Bank 18,04 -132,54 -834,77 -21,87 
Greek Banks Average 17,09 -95,31 -657,59 -24,20 
Eurozone Banks Average 9,00 -0,87 -109,65 6,44 
 
The significant deterioration of the Greek banks’ ROAE, during the crisis period 
(especially in FY2011), is evident through the graphical representation of Figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Graphical representation of the Return on Average Equity ratio (2004-2015) 
Capital Adequacy Indicators 
The following sub-section presents the analysis results on key indicators that trace 
banks’ capital adequacy and solvency. Capital adequacy is critical as it determines if 
banks have enough margin to handle a reasonable amount of losses before they 
become insolvent and consequently endanger depositors’ funds. Thresholds on capital 
adequacy ratios safeguard the efficiency and stability of a country’s financial system.  
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Tier I & Total Capital Ratios 
The capital adequacy ratios represent the regulatory capital held by a bank in 
comparison with the risks assumed (risk-weighted assets). Regulatory capital includes 
Tier I capital (share capital, reserves and non-controlling interests), additional Tier I 
capital (hybrid securities) and Tier II capital (subordinated debt, real estate properties 
revaluation reserves). Risk-weighted assets include the credit risk of the investment 
portfolio, the market risk of the trading portfolio and operational risk. Based on 
European Regulation 575/201314, as of 2015 the minimum limits per capital type were 
set to: 
 Tier I: 6% 
 Common Equity Tier 1: 4,5% 
 Tier II: 2% 
 Total Capital Ratio: 8% 
 
Moreover, a capital conservation and a countercyclical buffer of up to 2,5% of 
additional Common Equity Tier I capital have been established and are to be phased-in 
by 2019. The above limits must be satisfied on a standalone and on a consolidated 
basis. Furthermore, it must be noted that under Bank of Greece Executive Committee 
Act 13/28.3.201315, the Core Tier I minimum limit has been raised from 6% to 9% for 
all banks in Greece. Table 9 and Table 10 present respectively the average annual Tier I 
and Total Capital ratios per systemic Greek bank for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and 
crisis (2009-2015) period. On an average basis, throughout our research period the two 
capital ratios for the Greek and Eurozone banks appear higher than the minimum 
threshold, with the Eurozone banks managing to significantly increase their ratio even 
during the crisis period (increase of 45% for Tier I and 30% for Total capital). On an 
annual basis though, it must be noted that at the end of financial year 2011, two Greek 
banks (National Bank of Greece and Piraeus Bank) recorded negative Tier I and Total 
Capital ratios. Nevertheless, at the end of financial year 2015, following the third major 
recapitalization, the average of both ratios for the four domestic banks was exceeding 
16%.  
Table 9: Average annual Tier I ratio (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
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Tier I Ratio (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in  
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 9,54 12,51 31,18 16,70 
Eurobank Ergasias 8,93 12,71 42,38 17,00 
National Bank of Greece 11,14 9,56 -14,22 14,60 
Piraeus Bank 8,85 9,26 4,58 17,50 
Greek Banks Average 9,62 11,01 14,50 16,45 
Eurozone Banks Average 8,99 13,01 44,75 15,96 
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Table 10: Average annual Total Capital ratio (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Total Capital Ratio (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 12,26 13,37 9,07 16,80 
Eurobank Ergasias 11,30 13,30 17,70 17,40 
National Bank of Greece 13,20 10,14 -23,15 14,60 
Piraeus Bank 11,45 9,71 -15,17 17,50 
Greek Banks Average 12,05 11,63 -3,49 16,58 
Eurozone Banks Average 11,93 15,52 30,06 18,08 
 
 
The historical evolution of Tier I and Total Capital ratios for the Greek and Eurozone 
banks is presented in Figure 11 and Figure 12 respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Graphical representation of the Tier-1 ratio (2004-2015)  
 
 
Figure 12: Graphical representation of the Total Capital ratio (2004-2015)  
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Shareholders’ Equity to Total Assets Ratio 
The Equity to Assets ratio highlights two important financial concepts of a solvent and 
sustainable business16: i) how much of the total company assets are owned outright by 
the investors and ii) how leveraged the company is with debt. Table 11 presents the 
average annual Equity to Assets ratio per systemic Greek bank for the pre-crisis (2004-
2008) and crisis (2009-2015) period. Throughout our research period the average ratio 
appears relatively the same for the two groups of banks. Nevertheless, it must be 
taken into consideration that Greek banks were recapitalised three times during the 
crisis period. The last recapitalization took place at the end of 2015, following the 
results of an Asset Quality Review and Stress Tests performed by ECB. These tests 
identified for the four systemic banks an aggregate capital shortfall of €4,4 bn and 
€14,4 bn, under the baseline and adverse scenario respectively. The funds acquired 
through the recapitalization were mainly sourced from the Hellenic Financial Stability 
Fund (HFSF), as well as from private investors.   
Table 11: Average annual Equity to Total Assets ratio (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Equity / Total Assets 
(%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 7,06 8,12 14,96 13,07 
Eurobank Ergasias 6,89 5,50 -20,07 9,70 
National Bank of Greece 8,53 5,79 -32,15 8,83 
Piraeus Bank 6,99 4,86 -30,37 11,45 
Greek Banks Average 7,37 6,07 -17,61 10,76 
Eurozone Banks Average 5,47 6,30 15,21 6,82 
 
Figure 13 provides a graphical representation of the annual average Equity to Assets 
ratio for our research period. It is worth noting that in 2012, the ratio is negative which 
implies that the banks’ liabilities were exceeding their assets. 
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Figure 13: Graphical representation of the Equity to Total Assets ratio (2004-2015)  
 
Asset Quality Indicators 
The following sub-section presents the analysis results on credit risk indicators that 
trace banks’ asset quality in terms of their loan portfolios. The key importance of asset 
quality has been recorded by multiple studies that focused on the causes of bank 
failures and revealed that failing institutions have higher proportions of non-
performing loans prior to failure and that asset quality displays a statistically significant 
predictor of insolvency (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). 
Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans 
Loan loss provisions is an expense recorded on the income statement, set aside as an 
allowance for uncollected loans and loan payments17. This provision is used to cover a 
number of factors associated with potential loan losses including bad loans, customer 
defaults and renegotiated terms of a loan that incur lower than previously estimated 
payments. Table 12 presents the average accumulated annual Loan Loss Provisions to 
Gross Loans ratio per systemic Greek bank for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis 
(2009-2015) period. As noted, even in the pre-crisis period, Greek banks’ ratio (2,72%) 
appeared higher to the respective ratio of the Eurozone banks (1,80%). Moreover 
during the crisis, Greek banks’ ratio has significantly deteriorated (increase by 341%) 
reaching an overall period average of 12,02%, while the Eurozone banks’ one was 
recorded at 3,33%. It is worth noting that, for the financial year 2015, the respective 
ratio was 24,02% and the accumulated amount of loan loss provisions for the four 
systemic domestic banks was €57,9 bn, materially impacting the banks’ profitability.  
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Table 12: Average annual Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans ratio (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Loan Loss Provisions / 
Gross Loans (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 2,86 13,02 355,21 25,52 
Eurobank Ergasias 2,54 11,39 349,08 22,81 
National Bank of Greece 3,20 10,59 230,83 22,06 
Piraeus Bank 2,30 13,10 469,61 25,68 
Greek Banks Average 2,72 12,02 341,39 24,02 
Eurozone Banks Average 1,80 3,33 84,73 3,53 
 
Furthermore and as presented in Figure 14, the upward trend of the specific ratio 
implies further deterioration in the years to come. 
 
 
Figure 14: Graphical representation of the Loan Provisions to Gross Loans ratio (2004-2015)  
Impaired to Gross Loans  
Impaired are the loans for which management of the Bank believes that the full 
amount of the loan is not likely to be recovered and thus, has made relevant provisions 
in the financial statements. Table 13 presents the average annual Impaired to Gross 
Loans ratio per systemic Greek bank, for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-
2015) period. In the pre-crisis period, Greek banks’ ratio (4,13%) was higher but 
relatively close to the respective ratio of the Eurozone banks (2,73%). During the crisis 
though, Greek banks’ ratio has significantly deteriorated (increase by 511%) reaching 
an overall period average of 25,27%, while the Eurozone one was recorded at 6,44%. It 
is worth noting that at the end of 2015, the average ratio for the four systemic 
domestic banks was recorded at 43,73%, with Alpha Bank’s half the gross loan 
portfolio being classified in impairment status.  
Table 13: Average annual Impaired to Gross Loans ratio (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Impaired / Gross 
Loans (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 4,49 29,26 551,61 50,32 
Eurobank Ergasias 3,38 24,11 614,03 43,37 
National Bank of Greece 4,76 24,05 404,83 37,92 
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Piraeus Bank 3,89 23,67 507,78 43,30 
Greek Banks Average 4,13 25,27 511,72 43,73 
Eurozone Banks Average 2,73 6,44 136,19 7,50 
 
Furthermore and as presented in Figure 15, the upward trend of the specific ratio 
implies further deterioration in the years to come. 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Graphical representation of the Impaired to Gross Loans ratio (2004-2015) 
Loan Loss Reserves to Impaired Loans Ratio 
Loan loss reserves or impairment allowance is an estimation of the total loan amount 
that a bank is unlikely to recover. In cases where the value of the related collateral of 
the loan is at least as much as the recorded value of the loan, there is no need to 
establish a reserve for impairment. The higher the loan loss reserves to impaired loans 
ratio is, the more conservative the bank, in terms of its financial statements
18. Table 
14 presents the average annual Loss Reserves to Impaired Loans ratio per systemic 
Greek bank for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) period. The decrease 
of the ratio for both banking groups is ascribed at a great extent to the increase of the 
denominator, due to stricter regulations mainly by the Basel Committee. Nevertheless, 
it is worth noting that throughout our research period the Greek banks’ average ratio 
was significantly lower than the respective ratio of their Eurozone peers. Taking into 
account the adverse domestic market conditions, this could imply that the amount of 
loan loss reserves withheld by the Greek banks is not adequate and needs to be 
increased, leading to further losses. 
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Table 14: Average annual Loss Reserves to Impaired Loans ratio (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Loan Loss Reserves / 
Impaired Loans (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 54,01 44,18 -18,20 51,02 
Eurobank Ergasias 74,49 44,91 -39,70 52,60 
National Bank of Greece 66,88 43,97 -34,26 58,18 
Piraeus Bank 59,96 53,42 -10,90 59,30 
Greek Banks Average 63,83 46,62 -26,97 55,28 
Eurozone Banks Average 108,19 62,77 -41,98 60,71 
 
The downward trend of the specific ratio throughout our research period is presented 
in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16: Graphical representation of the Loss Reserves to Impaired Loans ratio (2004-2015) 
 
Liquidity Indicators 
The following sub-section presents the analysis results on banks’ liquidity risk 
indicators. Liquidity risk reflects the potential mismatch between incoming and 
outgoing payments, taking into account unexpected delays in loan repayments or 
unexpectedly high deposit outflows. Liquidity risk involves both the risk of unexpected 
increases in the cost of funding of the portfolio of assets and the risk of being unable 
to liquidate a position in a timely manner on reasonable terms. 
Loans to Customer Deposits 
The loan-to-deposit ratio (LTD) is used for assessing a bank's liquidity by dividing the 
bank's loans by its customer deposits19. If the ratio is too high, the bank may not have 
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enough liquidity to cover any unforeseen fund requirements, and conversely, if the 
ratio is too low, the bank may not be utilising its deposits efficiently and earning as 
much as it could. Table 15 presents the average annual Loan to Customer Deposits 
ratio per systemic Greek bank for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) 
period. In the pre-crisis period, Greek banks’ ratio (119%) appeared relatively close to 
100%, which means that the majority of fund requirements was covered by customer 
deposits. During the crisis though, the ratio has deteriorated reaching an overall period 
average of 141%. It is worth noting that at the end of 2015 and with the capital 
controls still active, the Greek banks’ average stood at 168%, with Alpha Bank facing 
the highest challenge (LTD ratio at 198%). In respect to the Eurozone banks, the ratio 
appears high (~170%), before and during the crisis and implies possible liquidity 
shortage.  
 
Table 15: Average annual Loan to Customer Deposits ratio (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Loans to Customer 
Deposits (%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 125,96 155,10 23,13 198,17 
Eurobank Ergasias 139,51 142,50 2,14 164,63 
National Bank of Greece 83,05 122,94 48,04 135,67 
Piraeus Bank 128,35 145,59 13,43 174,76 
Greek Banks Average 119,22 141,53 18,72 168,31 
Eurozone Banks Average 170,02 164,35 -3,33 149,08 
 
The upward trend of the specific ratio of the domestic banks, throughout our research 
period, is presented in Figure 17. 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Graphical representation of the Loan to Customer Deposits ratio (2004-2015) 
Liquid Assets to Deposits & Short-term (ST) Funding 
This ratio presents the value of liquid assets to short-term funding plus total deposits. 
Liquid assets include cash and due from banks, trading securities, loans and advances 
to banks, reverse repos and cash collaterals. Deposits and short term funding includes 
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total customer deposits (current, savings and term) and short term borrowing (money 
market instruments, CDs and other deposits). The higher this ratio, the more liquid the 
bank is and less vulnerable to a deposit-run. Table 16 presents the average annual 
Liquid Assets to Dep. & ST Funding ratio per systemic Greek bank for the pre-crisis 
(2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2015) period. In the pre-crisis period, Greek banks’ 
average ratio (24,58%) appears half the one of their Eurozone peers (51,48%). 
Moreover, during the crisis the specific ratio of domestic banks weakens further and 
drops to lower than ¼ of the Eurozone banks one. It is worth noting that at the end of 
2015, the average ratio for the four Greek banks was 6,89%, the lowest value recorded 
for our research period.  
Table 16: Average annual Liquid Assets/Dep. & ST Funding ratio (%) pre- and through-crisis. 
Liquid Assets / 
Deposits & ST Funding 
(%) 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Annual Average 
between the two 
periods 
Financial 
Year 2015 
Alpha Bank 22,29 9,44 -57,65 6,57 
Eurobank Ergasias 17,89 9,83 -45,06 6,77 
National Bank of Greece 33,22 10,28 -69,06 9,44 
Piraeus Bank 24,93 6,84 -72,57 4,76 
Greek Banks Average 24,58 9,10 -63,00 6,89 
Eurozone Banks Average 51,48 41,81 -18,79 39,49 
 
As presented in Figure 18, the specific ratio for the Greek banks has severely 
deteriorated through the crisis period. 
 
 
Figure 18: Graphical representation of Liquid Assets/Dep. & ST Funding ratio (2004-2015) 
Liquid Assets to Total Assets 
In addition to the above, we calculated, indicatively for financial year 2015, the 
average Liquid to Total Assets ratio. The results, presented in Table 17, reveal that the 
specific ratio for Eurozone banks is multiple times higher than the one of the domestic 
banks. 
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Table 17: Average Liquid Assets/Total Assets ratio for 2015. 
Liquid Assets / Total 
Assets (%) 
Financial Year 
2015 
Alpha Bank 5,35 
Eurobank Ergasias 5,64 
National Bank of Greece 5,78 
Piraeus Bank 4,00 
Greek Banks Average 5,19 
Eurozone Banks Average 23,37 
 
Funding from the Eurosystem 
As already mentioned, the severe economic turbulence and uncertainty during the first 
half of 2015, led to significant deposit outflows and caused the enforcement of capital 
controls that remain active till today. Furthermore, ECB lifted the waiver based on 
which it accepted, as funding collateral, notes issued or guaranteed by the Hellenic 
Republic. As presented in Table 18 and Figure 19, the aforementioned factors forced 
the domestic banks to almost double their funding dependence from the Eurosystem, 
mainly through the use of the costly Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) mechanism.  
Table 18: Funding of Greek banks from the Eurosystem for years 2014-2015. 
Eurosystem Funding  
€ bn 
2014 2015 Annual 
Increase (%) ECB ELA ECB ELA 
Alpha Bank 14,8 0,0 4,8 19,6 64,86 
Eurobank Ergasias 12,5 0,0 5,3 20,0 102,40 
National Bank of Greece 14,2 0,0 12,5 11,5 69,01 
Piraeus Bank 14,1 0,0 16,0 16,7 131,91 
Total 55,6 106,4 91,37 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Graphical representation of ELA increase during 2015 
 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)  
The LCR is a Basel III requirement, introduced on 1 January 2015, with the minimum 
requirement initially set at 60% and hereupon rise in equal annual steps to reach 100% 
on 1 January 2019. The LCR is calculated by dividing a bank's stock of high-quality 
liquid assets by its total net cash outflows over a 30-day stress period. Greek banks 
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avoided disclosing the actual LCR in their FY2015 annual reports and instead two of 
them noted the following: 
 
National Bank of Greece: “NBG was forced to resort to the ELA mechanism for funding 
and remained in this mechanism throughout the entire year. Thus, the use of LCR as a 
liquidity metric, under these circumstances, is not applicable.” 
 
Eurobank: “LCR is not an appropriate metric for liquidity risk for banks that are 
experiencing a system wide crisis for an extended period as is the case for Greek 
Banks.” 
 
Unfortunately, through the information provided by the Greek banks in their annual 
financial reports, we were able to calculate the LCR only for Alpha Bank, recorded at 
37,6% for 2015, considerably lower than the minimum threshold. It is apparent from 
the use of the ELA, as well as from the aforementioned statements, that the other 
three domestic systemic banks also didn’t meet the minimum LCR threshold in FY2015. 
 
Based on the above analysed indicators of the current sub-section, it is apparent that 
the Greek banking sector is facing severe liquidity problems and if capital controls 
were not active, banks most probably won’t be able to meet customer withdrawal 
demands. 
 
Probability of default 
Lastly, the formula developed by A. Charitou to estimate probability of default for 
financial institutions is applied on the 2008 (before the sovereign crisis begins) and 
2015 financial data for the four systemic domestic banks and the respective results are 
presented in Table 19. As already mentioned, the formula uses the “CAMELS” model 
performance indicators. It is apparent from the results that the sovereign crisis had a 
negative effect on those indicators, increasing considerably the probability of default 
for the four domestic banks.  
 
Table 19: Probability of default for Greek Banks for years 2014-2015. 
Probability of Default 2008 2015 
Alpha Bank 85% 97% 
Eurobank Ergasias 84% 97% 
National Bank of Greece 79% 99% 
Piraeus Bank 88% 98% 
Average 84% 98% 
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Section VI. Conclusions & Recommendations 
The main objective of this research was to present the evolution of key financial ratios 
and risk indicators of the four largest Greek banks during the years 2004-2015 and 
through that, record the impact of the sovereign crisis on the domestic banking sector. 
As already stated, due to the fact that the domestic crisis continues till today, its 
overall impact on the sector cannot be recorded through the current research. This 
limitation may be overcome through a complementary research, which can be 
conducted after the crisis in the country is officially over. 
 
The originality of this study consists in assessing the performance of the four systemic 
Greek banks through the crisis years, utilizing the latest available financial data and 
moreover comparing it to the performance of 130 systemic banks from all the 
Eurozone countries. To the best of my knowledge, there are no other published studies 
covering an analysis of the specific attributes. 
 
The results of the analysis revealed that the sovereign crisis led to a severe 
deterioration of almost all key indicators of the Greek systemic banks. Our findings 
appear in correlation to the results of the research studies presented in the foregoing 
literature review section, which also concluded that the macroeconomic environment 
in general and especially sovereign crisis has a negative impact on banks’ performance. 
Moreover, the conclusion is in alignment with the opinion expressed by multiple 
economic analysts, that in Greece it was the sovereign crisis that caused the Greek 
banking sector crisis and not the other way around, like in other European countries. 
Furthermore, as presented through the analysis, the negative impact of the crisis for 
the majority of the domestic banks’ ratios and indicators was significantly higher than 
that of their peers in the Eurozone. 
 
The causes of the challenges faced especially by the Greek banks are revealed to a 
great extend by taking a closer look at the inter-relationship between the country’s 
macroeconomic environment and the financial sector. Initially, the country’s 
consecutive credit rating downgrades led to the isolation of the Greek banks from the 
international money markets. Moreover, tight liquidity conditions were exacerbated 
by customer deposit withdrawals, as a result of the economic and political uncertainty, 
as well as due to the decline of household income. The latter was again driven mainly 
by macroeconomic factors, such as: a) significant increase of direct and indirect 
taxation, b) rise of unemployment to historic levels and, c) cuts imposed on salaries of 
the public and private sector. Moreover, the shrinkage of household income was the 
main reason for the significant increase of the banks’ non-performing exposures, 
leading to high loan provisions and consequently eroding the banks’ profits and capital 
base. As already mentioned, another cause of severe losses for the domestic banks 
was their considerable exposure to Greek government bonds and their participation in 
the PSI programme, which according to multiple researchers and analysts20 was a 
result of political pressure.  
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In terms of capital adequacy, the latest recapitalization of €14,4 bn, in 2015, might 
have raised the respective ratios to satisfactory levels, but the challenges for the Greek 
banks still hold. As presented, the impaired loans’ balance continues its upward trend, 
representing on average, in December 2015, 44% of the banks’ credit portfolios, with 
the Eurozone average recorded at only 7,5%. In this area also, the extensive delays by 
the government to legislate the respective debt-recovery framework kept the banks 
hostage for several years with no actual options. J. Fabo (2016), an analyst of the Fitch 
agency, believes that if the procrastination in NPL management continues, “a fourth 
recapitalisation is not out of the question”21. Moreover, the “bold and innovative 
initiatives” demanded by Y. Stournaras22, the head of the central bank, to weed out 
the banks’ loan portfolios are still to be materialised. 
 
Unfortunately, the challenges for the Greek Banks’ CEOs do not end there. As Greiff J. 
(2013) of Bloomberg points out23, a bank may die of cancer (capital shortage) or a 
heart attack (liquidity shortage). Although Greek banks appear, at least for now, to 
have won the cancer fight, they remain in intensive care as a result of more than one 
liquidity heart-attacks suffered in the last period. With capital controls in place for 
almost 2 years now, the customers’ trust in the banking sector remains absent, with no 
deposit inflow being recorded. As already noted, in 2015, due to the political 
uncertainty Greek banks’ funding from the Eurosystem (ECB & ELA) doubled, while till 
today dozens of billions of Euros are kept in home safe-deposit boxes24. It is indicative 
that in December 2015, the Loan to Deposit ratio for three of the domestic banks 
analyzed remained significantly higher that the Eurozone average, with Alpha Bank’s 
ratio reaching 198%. 
 
Apart from the individual indicators though, the prolonged sovereign crisis altered the 
overall banking sector landscape in two ways: 
i. Directly, through the resolution of multiple small domestic banks that were 
considered non-viable and the absorption of their portfolios from larger banks. 
ii. Indirectly, as a result of each bank management’s efficiency in handling the 
crisis impact and taking the appropriate business decisions in a timely manner. 
Based on the financial ratios and risk indicators analysed above, an overall 
ranking of the four domestic banks was derived for: a) the before crisis period, 
b) the crisis period, and c) the end of financial year 2015. As presented in the 
tables of Appendix D, National Bank of Greece had the best overall ranking 
before crisis, while Alpha Bank ranked last. During the crisis years though, 
Alpha Bank appears to have managed performance most efficiently, with the 
other three banks following and recording similar scoring. At the end of our 
research period (12/2015) though, Eurobank appears to be in the best position 
among our domestic banks group and National Bank of Greece in the worst. 
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It is important to note that following the outbreak of the global crisis, regulatory and 
supervisory authorities worked intensively on an improved and more proactive 
supervisory and monitoring framework that evolves till today. European Union 
member states tried for many years to address the systemic fragility of the financial 
industry through national banking policy tools. However, those efforts collided with 
the fact that local supervisory authorities always promoted and protected 
domestically-headquartered banks against their European competitors, under a 
perception that considered banks as instruments of the sovereign. Thus, the 
“integrated” European money market was basically divided into fragmented local 
markets with limited cross-border lending between banks. Under these conditions and 
with high inconsistency in interest rates and credit availability amongst European 
countries, the European Central Bank’s monetary policy and tactics could not have a 
uniform effect. These variations also resulted in financial markets treating each EU 
national market differently, something that does not correlate with a common 
currency monetary union. The landmark decision for the creation of a banking union in 
the EU was taken by the European Council of June 2012, with the explicit motivation to 
“break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”25. Following that decision, the 
key components defined as necessary for a successfully unified financial system and 
their role in addressing the sovereign-bank vicious circle were: 
 Single supervision entity under the name Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
Centralization of the supervisory mechanism averts local authorities from 
prejudicially promoting and protecting their domestic banks, thus enhancing 
competition in the banking industry. Moreover, the exchange of cross-border 
information and the performance of cross-comparisons by the single entity 
help to identify any risks that jeopardize the banking system or originate from 
it.  
 Single resolution entity under the name Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). 
Centralized decision-making on the resolution of financial institutions will allow 
bank crises to be managed more effectively and weaken the sovereign-bank 
link by putting an end on government financed bank bail-outs and moreover by 
allocating potential bank losses to shareholders and creditors instead of 
taxpayers. 
 Uniform regulation through the “Single Rulebook”, which amongst others will 
set in the future a maximum threshold on sovereign bonds, held in domestic 
banks’ portfolios. 
 Single deposit guarantee scheme on EU level that enhances trust and 
confidence, as far as bank deposits are concerned, leading to a liquidity 
increase for the banks. Such a scheme is not yet implemented and till now 
remains at national level. 
 Common fiscal backstop that will facilitate fiscal support through borrowings by 
a common centralised fund. This will ensure equivalent treatment among 
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institutions and limit bank’s recapitalizations or other types of financing by 
sovereigns. 
 
It must be noted that in the last three years, the comprehensive assessments, 
including stress tests and asset quality reviews (AQR), that were conducted by SSM on 
all European significant banks, already led to increased capital positions, which 
contributed to sector’s soundness and stability (Darvas, 2016). 
 
Another indicative initiative by the European authorities to break the vicious circle 
between the Greek banks and the sovereign was the domestic law passed, following 
their request, according to which, it is forbidden for members of political parties or for 
individuals that held a government position in the past four years to participate in the 
Board of Directors of the Greek banks.  
 
Besides the evolutionary steps performed by EU towards a banking union, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision also responded to the financial crisis with the 
issuance of the Basel III Accord, prescribing new stricter and broader global standards 
to address both bank-specific and expansive systemic risks. Moreover, part of the 
Committee’s 2015-2016 work programme26, was a detailed assessment of the 
regulatory treatment of sovereign risk. The results of that review are still to be 
published. 
 
In the beginning of 2017 and with the sovereign crisis and the political and economic 
uncertainty still present, Greek banks should take actions and initiatives to restore the 
damage, reverse any negative trends and improve their performance ratios. In terms 
of the challenges mentioned, these initiatives should indicatively include but not be 
limited to: 
 Active and close management of the non-performing loans, utilising all 
available debt-recovery options prescribed by the law and the regulatory 
framework, such as restructuring, foreclosure, etc. Although the upsurge of the 
NPLs seems to have been out of banks’ control, many bank executives believe 
that their efficient administration in the years to come might determine the 
future of the Greek banking sector. 
 Identification of loans that are still in performing status but present warning 
signs of possible future delinquency or do not have adequate collaterals and 
initialization of proactive restructuring actions that may prevent additional 
provisions and losses. Moreover, exercises similar to the Asset Quality Reviews, 
performed by the EBA, should be executed internally by each bank, in order to 
identify any credit exposure with relatively low value collateral. 
 Performance of periodic internal stress tests, similar to the ones executed by 
the EBA, to assess each bank’s capital adequacy under adverse scenarios. 
 Formulation by top management of new business plans and models, adapted to 
the current economic environment and conditions. It must be noted that the 
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existence of realistic business plans in the Eurozone banks was declared as one 
of the key priorities of the Single Supervisory Mechanism for the years 2016 
and 2017. 
 Timely identification and effective management of all types of risk each Bank 
faces such as credit, market, sovereign, operational, reputational, fraud, etc. 
Moreover, setting of clear borders by top management on the total risk each 
Bank is willing to accept (risk appetite), based on its risk profile (risk averse vs. 
risk taking).  
 Building of an effective and concrete corporate governance structure, in 
accordance with the latest (2015) corporate governance principles of the Basel 
Committee27.  Effective corporate governance is critical in order to achieve 
robust and transparent risk management and decision-making and 
consequently promote public confidence and uphold the safety and soundness 
of the banking system. 
 Cost reduction and disinvestment from non-banking subsidiaries like hotels, 
real estate and insurance companies, etc. as prescribed by the agreed with 
European Commission’s DG Comp (Directorate-General for Competition) 
restructuring plans, in order for the banks to focus purely on financial services 
and improve their financial ratios.   
It is acknowledged that financial institutions were at the centre of a crisis that basically 
reshaped the world of finance. They have to concede the fact that the new operating 
environment is a completely different one and that it requires changes in their 
business plans and structural model. To take advantage of the change and preserve 
their income levels and streams, they need to adjust and adapt today rather than 
tomorrow. 
In a nutshell, as a Chinese proverb states banks need to “welcome what they cannot 
avoid”.
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Banks Based in Greece 
 
Bank Name 
National Bank of Greece 
Alpha Bank 
Attica Bank 
Pireaus Bank 
Eurobank 
Investment Bank Greece 
Aegean Baltic Bank 
Credicom Consumer Finance Bank 
Co-Operative Bank Chania 
Co-Operative Bank Ipeiros 
Co-Operative Bank Crete 
Co-Operative Bank Evros 
Co-Operative Bank Karditsa 
Co-Operative Bank Thessalia 
Co-Operative Bank Pieria 
Co-Operative Bank Drama 
 Co-Operative Bank Serres 
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Appendix B – Banks in Eurozone forming our comparison group 
 
Bank Name Ctry Bank Name Ctry Bank Name Ctry 
Aareal Bank AG DE CA Consumer Finance SA FR ING-DiBa AG DE 
Abanca Corporacion Bancaria SA ES CACEIS Bank Luxembourg LU Instituto de Crédito Oficial ES 
ABN AMRO Bank NV NL Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance Ile-de-
France SA 
FR Intesa Sanpaolo IT 
Agence Française de Développement FR Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations-Groupe 
Caisse des Dépôts 
FR KBC Bank NV BE 
Allied Irish Banks plc IE Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel de 
Paris et d'Ile-de-France SC-Crédit Agricole 
d'Ile-de-France 
FR KBC Groep NV/ KBC Groupe SA-KBC Group BE 
Argenta Bank and Insurance Group SA-
Argenta Bank en Verzekeringsgroep NV 
BE Caixa Geral de Depositos PT KfW Bankengruppe-KfW Group DE 
Argenta Spaarbank-ASPA BE Crédit Industriel et Commercial SA - CIC FR Kutxabank SA ES 
AXA Bank Europe SA/NV BE Credit Mutuel Arkea SA FR La Banque Postale FR 
Banca Carige SpA IT Crédit Mutuel Nord Europe SA FR Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg DE 
Banca IMI SpA IT Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM IT Landesbank Hessen-Thueringen Girozentrale - 
HELABA 
DE 
Banca Mediolanum SpA IT Criteria CaixaHolding SA ES Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank DE 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-Gruppo 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
IT Caixabank, S.A. ES Le Crédit Lyonnais (LCL) SA FR 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA IT Cajamar Caja Rural, S.C.C. ES Liberbank SA ES 
Banca popolare dell'Emilia Romagna IT Cassa Depositi e Prestiti IT Lyonnaise de Banque SA FR 
Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL IT Cassa di Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza SpA IT Mediobanca SpA-MEDIOBANCA - Banca di 
Credito Finanziario Società per Azioni 
IT 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Societa 
Cooperativa per Azioni 
IT Catalunya Banc SA ES Municipality Finance Plc-Kuntarahoitus Oyj FI 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza Societa 
cooperativa per azioni 
IT Commerzbank AG DE Natixis SA FR 
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Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA ES Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. NL Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
NORD/LB 
DE 
Banco BPI SA PT Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment 
Bank SA-Credit Agricole CIB 
FR Nordea Bank Finland Plc FI 
Banco Comercial Português, SA-Millennium 
bcp 
PT Crédit Agricole S.A. FR Novo Banco PT 
Banco de Sabadell SA ES Crédit du Nord SA FR OP Corporate Bank plc FI 
Banco Popolare - Società Cooperativa-Banco 
Popolare 
IT Crédit Foncier de France SA FR OP-Pohjola Group Central Cooperative FI 
Banco Popular Espanol SA ES Danske Bank Plc FI Raiffeisen Bank International AG AT 
Banco Santander SA ES DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale AG DE Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG - RZB AT 
Banco Santander Totta SA PT Delta Lloyd NV-Delta Lloyd Group NL Raiffeisenlandesbank Oberösterreich AG AT 
BancoPosta-Poste Italiane IT Depfa Bank Plc IE RCI Banque SA FR 
Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft und 
Österreichische Postsparkasse 
Aktiengesellschaft-BAWAG P.S.K. AG 
AT Deutsche Bank AG DE Santander Consumer Finance ES 
Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten NV, BNG NL Deutsche Kreditbank AG (DKB) DE Santander Totta SGPS PT 
Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of 
the Bank of Ireland 
IE Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG DE SNS Bank N.V. NL 
Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV BE Deutsche Postbank AG DE Société Générale SA FR 
Bankia, SA ES Dexia Crédit Local SA FR Ulster Bank Ireland Limited IE 
Bankinter SA ES Dexia SA BE UniCredit Bank AG DE 
Banque de France FR DZ Bank AG-Deutsche Zentral-
Genossenschaftsbank 
DE UniCredit Bank Austria AG-Bank Austria AT 
Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat 
Luxembourg 
LU Erste Group Bank AG AT UniCredit SpA IT 
Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel FR Fédération du Crédit Mutuel FR Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa-UBI Banca IT 
Bausparkasse Schwäbisch Hall AG, 
Bausparkasse der Volksbanken und 
Raiffeisenbanken 
DE Fundacion Bancaria Caixa D Estalvis I 
Pensions De Barcelona 
ES Veneto Banca scpa IT 
Bayerische Landesbank DE HASPA Finanzholding DE Volkswagen Bank GmbH DE 
Belfius Banque SA/NV-Belfius Bank SA/NV BE HSBC France SA FR Volkswagen Financial Services AG DE 
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BFA Tenedora de Acciones SAU ES HSH Nordbank AG DE WGZ-Bank AG Westdeutsche 
Genossenschafts-Zentralbank 
DE 
BGL BNP Paribas LU Ibercaja Banco SAU ES Wüstenrot & Württembergische DE 
BNP Paribas FR Iccrea Holding SpA IT   
BNP Paribas Fortis SA/ NV BE ING Bank NV NL   
BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA FR ING Belgium SA/NV-ING BE   
BPCE SA FR ING Groep NV NL   
BPIFrance Financement SA FR     
BRED Banque Populaire SC FR     
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Appendix C – Analytical annual data per financial ratio and risk indicator (2004-2015) 
 
Asset Growth (%) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 7,91 32,40 13,16 9,81 19,36 16,53 6,63 -4,02 -11,45 -1,51 26,51 -1,03 -4,99 1,45 -91,24 
Eurobank 17,90 34,55 21,04 27,07 20,20 24,15 2,51 3,46 -11,89 -11,94 14,68 -2,67 -2,60 -1,21 -105,00 
National Bank of Greece  1,48 10,90 26,72 18,04 12,67 13,96 11,35 6,48 -11,49 -1,94 5,85 3,86 -3,45 1,52 -89,09 
Piraeus Bank 14,33 39,77 31,37 50,10 18,23 30,76 -1,11 6,26 -14,44 42,67 30,68 -2,96 -1,97 8,45 -72,54 
Greek Banks Average 10,41 29,41 23,07 26,26 17,62 21,35 4,85 3,05 -12,32 6,82 19,43 -0,70 -3,25 2,55 -88,04 
Eurozone Banks Average 7,43 20,34 11,27 13,15 9,33 12,30 0,50 5,11 4,49 2,29 -5,64 3,76 -0,45 1,44 -88,32 
 
Loan Growth (%) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 28,66 22,74 16,91 29,25 21,13 23,74 2,04 -2,86 -3,45 -9,17 38,95 -0,71 -0,52 3,47 -85,39 
Eurobank Ergasias 29,92 25,42 27,47 33,70 22,75 27,85 0,51 1,77 -12,13 -7,09 11,82 -3,02 -0,38 -1,22 -104,37 
National Bank of Greece 17,38 12,85 44,11 27,51 23,19 25,01 3,31 12,89 -2,73 -2,18 -1,04 3,39 -26,01 -1,77 -107,07 
Piraeus Bank 13,92 30,54 30,98 47,59 27,07 30,02 -0,85 1,00 -5,15 36,47 50,50 -4,11 -6,73 10,16 -66,15 
Greek Banks Average 22,47 22,89 29,87 34,51 23,54 26,65 1,25 3,20 -5,87 4,51 25,06 -1,11 -8,41 2,66 -90,02 
Eurozone Banks Average 8,97 21,06 16,27 14,88 15,54 15,34 1,90 7,74 8,81 0,42 -2,24 2,10 1,85 2,94 -80,84 
 
Customer Deposit Growth 
(%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 2,20 4,58 8,91 47,06 22,73 17,10 0,87 -10,77 -23,22 -5,86 50,68 2,17 -26,55 -1,81 -110,61 
Eurobank Ergasias -0,76 5,75 24,20 26,21 40,77 19,23 10,17 -5,07 -26,95 -6,42 32,11 0,59 -22,22 -2,54 -113,22 
National Bank of Greece 4,84 6,08 22,80 13,71 11,77 11,84 5,23 -4,47 -12,49 -1,36 7,05 3,17 -33,82 -5,24 -144,26 
Piraeus Bank 18,74 21,43 26,81 26,66 31,25 24,98 7,96 -2,61 -26,15 71,10 46,79 0,82 -28,80 9,87 -60,47 
Greek Banks Average 6,26 9,46 20,68 28,41 26,63 18,29 6,06 -5,73 -22,20 14,37 34,16 1,69 -27,85 0,07 -99,62 
Eurozone Banks Average 303,02 164,13 26,50 10,53 7,76 102,39 3,02 10,31 1,01 4,03 1,44 4,90 6,80 4,50 -95,60 
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Cost to Income (%) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 50,94 48,85 45,97 46,01 50,49 48,45 50,53 51,05 48,00 74,16 59,14 63,25 55,84 57,42 18,52 
Eurobank Ergasias 51,85 47,47 46,87 48,11 47,89 48,44 48,29 48,77 51,53 60,29 70,33 63,20 62,83 57,89 19,52 
National Bank of Greece 74,63 53,88 51,57 52,44 49,66 56,44 49,74 54,13 58,10 68,88 68,41 82,91 88,20 67,20 19,07 
Piraeus Bank 61,50 58,29 55,14 50,65 53,97 55,91 53,62 59,03 67,32 48,19 78,52 59,23 64,83 61,53 10,06 
Greek Banks Average 59,73 52,12 49,89 49,30 50,50 52,31 50,55 53,25 56,24 62,88 69,10 67,15 67,93 61,01 16,64 
Eurozone Banks Average 61,87 59,51 56,10 58,84 73,42 61,95 58,27 59,63 65,25 68,41 61,91 65,93 61,93 63,05 1,77 
 
Net Interest Margin (%) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 3,53 3,50 3,34 3,40 3,30 3,41 2,84 2,92 3,15 2,61 2,78 2,94 3,10 2,91 -14,89 
Eurobank Ergasias 3,64 3,85 3,55 3,59 3,48 3,62 3,07 2,86 2,75 2,27 1,96 2,17 2,28 2,48 -31,53 
National Bank of Greece 2,72 3,10 3,55 4,28 4,31 3,59 4,12 4,00 3,85 3,61 3,36 2,06 2,24 3,32 -7,57 
Piraeus Bank 3,23 3,33 3,07 2,75 2,68 3,01 2,31 2,43 2,51 2,03 2,37 2,49 2,53 2,38 -20,94 
Greek Banks Average 3,28 3,45 3,38 3,51 3,44 3,41 3,09 3,05 3,07 2,63 2,62 2,42 2,54 2,77 -18,72 
Eurozone Banks Average 1,81 1,68 1,60 1,53 1,57 1,64 1,56 1,53 1,42 1,37 1,34 1,40 1,40 1,43 -12,61 
 
Profit before Tax 
€ mn 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 575 642 801 985 626 725,80 502 216 -4.732 -1.345 2.278 -1.011 -2.066 -879,71 -221,21 
Eurobank Ergasias 500 676 832 1.050 818 775,20 398 136 -6.955 -1.694 -1.901 -1.751 -2.086 -1.979,00 -355,29 
National Bank of Greece 428 943 1.268 1.903 1.937 1.295,80 1.252 638 -13.420 -1.973 -179 -1.815 -3.589 -2.726,57 -310,42 
Piraeus Bank 206 305 557 785 386 447,80 287 11 -7.477 -1.183 1.748 -3.014 -2.930 -1.794,00 -500,63 
Greek Banks Average 427 641 864 1.180 941 811,15 609 250 -8.146 -1.548 486 -1.897 -2.667 -1.844,82 -327,43 
Eurozone Banks Average 736 1.371 1.708 1.416 57 1.057,60 464 959 285 -109 435 781 1.079 556,29 -47,40 
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Return on Average Assets 
(%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 1,24 1,31 1,18 1,63 0,86 1,24 0,52 0,13 -6,05 -1,84 4,43 -0,45 -1,93 -0,74 -159,60 
Eurobank Ergasias 1,07 1,30 1,24 1,36 0,90 1,17 0,38 0,10 -6,70 -2,00 -1,59 -1,56 -1,55 -1,85 -257,22 
National Bank of Greece 0,54 1,31 1,55 1,97 1,65 1,40 0,90 0,38 -10,83 -2,01 0,75 0,09 -3,71 -2,06 -246,83 
Piraeus Bank 1,05 1,40 1,68 1,68 0,65 1,29 0,38 -0,04 -12,37 -0,85 3,14 -2,18 -2,15 -2,01 -255,57 
Greek Banks Average 0,98 1,33 1,41 1,66 1,02 1,28 0,55 0,14 -8,99 -1,68 1,68 -1,03 -2,34 -1,66 -230,20 
Eurozone Banks Average 0,54 0,70 0,82 0,69 0,21 0,59 0,27 0,32 0,08 -0,30 0,13 0,28 0,41 0,17 -71,28 
 
Return on Average Equity 
(%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 17,54 18,50 16,45 21,53 12,47 17,30 7,04 1,46 -98,32 -79,72 64,12 -4,10 -16,37 -17,98 -203,97 
Eurobank Ergasias 16,15 18,07 17,29 18,50 13,56 16,71 5,78 1,35 -157,73 -1.321 -59,82 -22,09 -17,19 -224,51 -1443,27 
National Bank of Greece 8,38 19,24 16,19 18,93 18,86 16,32 10,65 4,25 -231,40 185,71 27,68 1,16 -41,38 -6,19 -137,93 
Piraeus Bank 12,03 17,28 25,08 25,34 10,46 18,04 6,19 -0,62 -992,29 23,80 81,89 -24,86 -21,87 -132,54 -834,77 
Greek Banks Average 13,53 18,27 18,75 21,08 13,84 17,09 7,42 1,61 -369,94 -298,03 28,47 -12,47 -24,20 -95,31 -657,59 
Eurozone Banks Average 9,82 13,36 14,61 11,86 -4,66 9,00 1,93 4,77 -3,78 -21,46 2,31 3,71 6,44 -0,87 -109,65 
 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio (%) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 9,20 10,40 10,20 9,60 8,30 9,54 11,70 11,80 4,20 12,80 16,10 14,30 16,70 12,51 31,18 
Eurobank Ergasias 8,03 10,94 8,46 9,22 8,00 8,93 11,50 10,60 11,50 11,60 10,60 16,20 17,00 12,71 42,38 
National Bank of Greece 11,80 12,31 12,40 9,20 10,00 11,14 11,30 13,10 -3,70 7,80 10,30 13,50 14,60 9,56 -14,22 
Piraeus Bank 10,30 8,80 7,40 9,76 8,00 8,85 9,10 8,70 -6,10 9,30 13,90 12,40 17,50 9,26 4,58 
Greek Banks Average 9,83 10,61 9,62 9,45 8,58 9,62 10,90 11,05 1,48 10,38 12,73 14,10 16,45 11,01 14,50 
Eurozone Banks Average 8,79 8,78 9,25 8,98 9,14 8,99 10,58 11,60 12,10 12,78 13,92 14,13 15,96 13,01 44,75 
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Total Capital Ratio (%) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 12,30 13,50 12,90 12,50 10,10 12,26 13,30 13,50 9,50 9,50 16,40 14,60 16,80 13,37 9,07 
Eurobank Ergasias 9,93 13,54 10,40 12,23 10,40 11,30 12,70 11,70 12,00 11,60 11,10 16,60 17,40 13,30 17,70 
National Bank of Greece 14,70 15,19 15,60 10,20 10,30 13,20 11,30 13,70 -2,60 9,20 11,20 13,60 14,60 10,14 -23,15 
Piraeus Bank 13,10 11,00 11,00 12,26 9,90 11,45 9,80 9,60 -5,10 9,70 14,00 12,50 17,50 9,71 -15,17 
Greek Banks Average 12,51 13,31 12,48 11,80 10,18 12,05 11,78 12,13 3,45 10,00 13,18 14,33 16,58 11,63 -3,49 
Eurozone Banks Average 11,79 11,56 12,13 11,87 12,32 11,93 13,59 14,40 14,77 15,34 16,27 16,20 18,08 15,52 30,06 
 
Equity / Total Assets (%) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 7,06 7,10 7,26 7,85 6,04 7,06 8,58 8,66 3,32 1,28 11,35 10,57 13,07 8,12 14,96 
Eurobank Ergasias 6,60 7,64 6,73 7,84 5,62 6,89 7,49 6,99 1,14 -0,97 5,83 8,35 9,70 5,50 -20,07 
National Bank of Greece 6,41 7,14 11,54 9,45 8,12 8,53 8,67 9,03 -0,24 -1,95 7,10 9,08 8,83 5,79 -32,15 
Piraeus Bank 8,69 7,68 5,92 7,13 5,51 6,99 6,66 5,68 -3,93 -3,30 9,29 8,20 11,45 4,86 -30,37 
Greek Banks Average 7,19 7,39 7,86 8,07 6,32 7,37 7,85 7,59 0,07 -1,24 8,39 9,05 10,76 6,07 -17,61 
Eurozone Banks Average 5,15 5,44 5,81 5,81 5,15 5,47 5,88 5,97 6,21 6,30 6,56 6,39 6,82 6,30 15,21 
 
Loan Loss Provisions / 
Gross Loans (%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 3,28 3,66 2,94 1,96 2,45 2,86 3,10 4,31 9,79 10,19 17,69 20,50 25,52 13,02 355,21 
Eurobank Ergasias 2,76 2,78 2,47 2,21 2,46 2,54 3,03 3,97 6,60 9,76 14,74 18,79 22,81 11,39 349,08 
National Bank of Greece 3,97 3,55 3,38 2,77 2,34 3,20 3,43 4,41 9,06 10,10 11,63 13,44 22,06 10,59 230,83 
Piraeus Bank 3,81 2,73 1,81 1,35 1,80 2,30 2,57 3,67 8,24 11,78 18,06 21,70 25,68 13,10 469,61 
Greek Banks Average 3,45 3,18 2,65 2,07 2,26 2,72 3,03 4,09 8,42 10,46 15,53 18,61 24,02 12,02 341,39 
Eurozone Banks Average 2,05 1,74 1,61 1,73 1,89 1,80 2,55 2,79 3,08 3,61 3,91 3,86 3,53 3,33 84,73 
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Impaired / Gross Loans (%) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 4,50 4,49 5,08 3,86 4,52 4,49 6,66 10,44 21,16 26,62 44,76 44,84 50,32 29,26 551,61 
Eurobank Ergasias 2,91 3,38 3,47 3,23 3,89 3,38 7,28 10,45 15,34 22,97 30,74 38,59 43,37 24,11 614,03 
National Bank of Greece 5,30 4,70 5,35 4,16 4,31 4,76 6,90 10,48 26,49 31,58 28,60 26,38 37,92 24,05 404,83 
Piraeus Bank 4,08 3,41 5,03 3,39 3,56 3,89 5,08 7,58 17,07 21,45 30,68 40,51 43,30 23,67 507,78 
Greek Banks Average 4,20 4,00 4,73 3,66 4,07 4,13 6,48 9,74 20,02 25,66 33,70 37,58 43,73 25,27 511,72 
Eurozone Banks Average 3,06 2,60 2,44 2,49 3,04 2,73 4,42 4,93 5,78 6,64 7,77 8,03 7,50 6,44 136,19 
 
Loan Loss Reserves / 
Impaired Loans (%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 52,70 54,33 57,99 50,70 54,31 54,01 46,49 41,27 46,28 38,30 39,92 45,96 51,02 44,18 -18,20 
Eurobank Ergasias 94,98 74,49 71,16 68,51 63,29 74,49 41,59 38,03 43,01 42,51 47,97 48,69 52,60 44,91 -39,70 
National Bank of Greece 74,84 75,47 63,28 66,57 54,23 66,88 49,77 42,05 34,18 31,99 40,67 50,93 58,18 43,97 -34,26 
Piraeus Bank 93,27 79,95 36,08 39,92 50,58 59,96 50,59 48,41 48,26 54,94 58,87 53,58 59,30 53,42 -10,90 
Greek Banks Average 78,95 71,06 57,13 56,43 55,60 63,83 47,11 42,44 42,93 41,94 46,86 49,79 55,28 46,62 -26,97 
Eurozone Banks Average 148,39 111,44 107,27 103,13 70,72 108,19 63,15 70,11 62,62 62,34 59,81 60,63 60,71 62,77 -41,98 
 
Loans  / Customer Deposits 
(%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 111,79 131,20 140,83 123,79 122,17 125,96 123,60 134,56 169,21 163,27 150,55 146,31 198,17 155,10 23,13 
Eurobank Ergasias 119,91 142,22 145,97 154,63 134,84 139,51 123,01 131,87 158,63 157,51 133,32 128,54 164,63 142,50 2,14 
National Bank of Greece 66,39 70,62 82,87 92,93 102,42 83,05 100,56 118,84 132,09 130,99 121,08 121,34 135,67 122,94 48,04 
Piraeus Bank 111,97 120,37 124,32 144,85 140,23 128,35 128,78 133,56 171,52 136,81 140,27 133,40 174,76 145,59 13,43 
Greek Banks Average 102,52 116,10 123,50 129,05 124,92 119,22 118,99 129,71 157,86 147,15 136,31 132,40 168,31 141,53 18,72 
Eurozone Banks Average 159,57 150,92 175,32 184,30 179,99 170,02 176,38 173,44 175,70 165,30 154,43 156,14 149,08 164,35 -3,33 
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Liquid Assets / Deposits & 
ST Funding (%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Average 
2004-2008 
Pre-Crisis 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Annual 
Average 
2009-2015 
Through-Crisis 
Difference in 
Ann. Average 
between the 
two periods 
Alpha Bank 32,10 23,85 25,18 18,00 12,32 22,29 16,02 11,99 7,56 9,01 6,94 7,99 6,57 9,44 -57,65 
Eurobank Ergasias 18,74 18,95 17,47 18,54 15,73 17,89 13,12 13,23 12,45 10,36 5,77 7,08 6,77 9,83 -45,06 
National Bank of Greece 45,47 42,06 36,50 31,26 10,82 33,22 12,96 9,82 9,08 12,26 9,24 9,16 9,44 10,28 -69,06 
Piraeus Bank 22,34 28,26 28,50 29,07 16,48 24,93 11,15 11,53 6,30 5,24 3,70 5,19 4,76 6,84 -72,57 
Greek Banks Average 29,66 28,28 26,91 24,22 13,84 24,58 13,31 11,64 8,85 9,22 6,41 7,36 6,89 9,10 -63,00 
Eurozone Banks Average 40,47 48,22 53,84 59,12 55,75 51,48 45,57 41,80 39,58 43,58 42,19 40,44 39,49 41,81 -18,79 
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Appendix D – Ranking of the four domestic banks before and during crisis and at the end of FY2015 
 
Ranking based on 
Ann. Average for 
2004-2008 
(before crisis) 
Asset 
Growth 
Credit 
Growth 
Custo. 
Deposit 
Growth 
Cost to 
Income 
Net 
Interest 
Margin 
Profit 
before 
Tax 
ROAA ROAE Tier I 
Total 
Capital 
Ratio 
Equity 
/ Total 
Assets 
Loss 
Prov. / 
Gross 
Loans 
Impaired 
/ Gross 
Loans 
Loan Loss 
Reserves / 
Impaired 
Loans 
Loans / 
Customer 
Deposits 
Liquid 
Assets. / 
Dep. & 
ST 
Funding 
Total 
Alpha Bank 3 4 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 2 3 44 
Eurobank Ergasias 2 2 2 1 1 2 4 3 3 4 4 4 1 1 4 4 42 
National Bank of 
Greece 
4 3 4 4 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 2 4 2 1 1 36 
Piraeus Bank 1 1 1 3 4 4 2 1 4 3 3 1 2 3 3 2 38 
                  
Ranking based on 
Ann. Average for 
2009-2015 
(during crisis) 
Asset 
Growth 
Credit 
Growth 
Cust. 
Deposit 
Growth 
Cost to 
Income 
Net 
Interest 
Margin 
Profit 
before 
Tax 
ROAA ROAE Tier I 
Total 
Capital 
Ratio 
Equity 
/ Total 
Assets 
Loss 
Prov. / 
Gross 
Loans 
Impaired 
/ Gross 
Loans 
Loan Loss 
Reserves / 
Impaired 
Loans 
Loans / 
Customer 
Deposits 
Liquid 
Assets. / 
Dep. & 
ST 
Funding 
Total 
Alpha Bank 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 4 3 4 3 33 
Eurobank Ergasias 4 3 3 2 3 3 2 4 1 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 42 
National Bank of 
Greece 
2 4 4 4 1 4 4 1 3 3 2 2 2 4 1 1 42 
Piraeus Bank 1 1 1 3 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 1 1 3 4 43 
                  
Ranking based on 
FY2015 
Asset 
Growth 
Credit 
Growth 
Cust. 
Deposit 
Growth 
Cost to 
Income 
Net 
Interest 
Margin 
Profit 
before 
Tax 
ROAA ROAE Tier I 
Total 
Capital 
Ratio 
Equity 
/ Total 
Assets 
Loss 
Prov. / 
Gross 
Loans 
Impaired 
/ Gross 
Loans 
Loan Loss 
Reserves / 
Impaired 
Loans 
Loans / 
Customer 
Deposits 
Liquid 
Assets. / 
Dep. & 
ST 
Funding 
Total 
Alpha Bank 4 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 3 3 1 1 4 4 4 3 37 
Eurobank Ergasias 2 1 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 35 
National Bank of 
Greece 
3 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 1 1 50 
Piraeus Bank 1 3 3 3 2 4 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 3 4 38 
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Appendix E – GDP Growth28 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
28
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/National_accounts_and_GDP 
